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Realising the right to food in South Africa requires more than an increase in food production. 
Increasing access to food is equally important, so this contribution adopts a 'food systems 
approach'. It argues that food security is not just a national and/or provincial government 
concern but that the Constitution demands of municipalities to contribute to realising the 
right to food. Against the backdrop of a general introduction into the division of 
responsibilities between national, provincial and local government, it deploys two 
arguments to make this assertion. The first is located in the jurisprudence of the South 
African Constitutional Court on socio-economic rights. The second is located in the division 
of powers between national, provincial and local government. This contribution explores 
various linkages between a municipality’s constitutional powers and food security. Specific 
emphasis is placed on the municipality’s responsibility to regulate trade and markets as well 
as its responsibility to conduct spatial planning and land use management. 
 
Key words: food security, local government, provincial government, multilevel government, 
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South Africa produces sufficient food to feed its people, yet household food insecurity and 
malnutrition is unacceptably high.1 It is not uncommon to argue that addressing food 
insecurity is primarily the responsibility of the national and provincial governments and that 
local government’s role is limited.2 Food security is often associated with food production 
and thus with agriculture. Since the Constitution allocates agriculture to the national and 
provincial governments,3 local government bears little responsibility, so the argument goes. 
This paper argues that this is a fundamentally wrong proposition for a number of reasons. 
 
First, food security will not be achieved by ensuring food production alone. South Africa 
produces enough food yet has unacceptably high food insecurity levels. Food security is as 
much about access and quality as it is about production. South Africa’s food insecurity 
challenge is inextricably linked to the high levels of poverty and the gaping inequality. This 
negatively influences people’s access to, and ability to make food choices. Most South 
Africans are simply too poor to make healthy food choices and are thus food insecure. A 2016 
survey revealed that that 19.9% of households had run out of money to buy food in the 
twelve months prior to the survey.4 This is not addressed by increasing production. Secondly, 
there are many structural and systemic problems in South Africa’s food system that impede 
food security. For example, the food value chain is one-dimensional: it is dominated by large 
scale farmers, major agri-processors and big retail stores.5 Small scale framers and small 
retailers occupy a very minor position in South Africa’s food system. This is despite the fact 
that diversity in the food value chain is an essential ingredient of a sustainable food system. 
 
The above two arguments alone (there are many more) are sufficient to dispel the notion 
that addressing food insecurity is somehow an agricultural and therefore primarily national 
and provincial issue. However, there is a further avenue to rebut the notion that 
municipalities are not responsible for realising food security and this relates to the 
interpretation of the right of access to sufficient food. 
                                                             
 
1 Oxfam GB “Hidden Hunger in Southern Africa: The Faces of Hunger and Malnutrition in a Food-Secure Nation” (2014) 
pp 2-12. See also Johnstone S (2018) Municipal Planning to Facilitate Access to Food p 50 (PhD Thesis, forthcoming). 
2 Steytler, N (2009) ‘The Decisions in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd V Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (1) Sa 337 (Cc): Be Wary 
of these Holdings’ in Constitutional Court Review 2009(2) at p 444. 
3 Sections 44(1) and 104(1) read with Schedule 4, Part A of the Constitution.  
4 Statistics South Africa Statistical release: community survey 2016 available at www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=737&id=1 
(accessed 24 June 2018). 
5 60 percent of the formal markets are owned by five retailers and 32 percent is shared by the informal trading sector. See 
Oxfam 2014, 34; Johnstone (2018). 
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1.1 The right to food and multilevel government 
There is a right of access to sufficient food in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. The 
argument that this right must be ‘realised’ by the national government and that 
municipalities cannot be held accountable for residents being food insecure may be 
attractive. It is then argued that food insecurity must be addressed by the national 
government by increasing food production and by ensuring a social welfare safety net for the 
most vulnerable. This would then absolve municipalities from any accountability for realising 
the right of access to sufficient food. 
 
However, the manner in which the Constitutional Court has interpreted the responsibilities 
of local government in respect of other socio-economic rights runs counter to the above 
approach. This becomes clear in particular with respect to the right of access to housing. 
 
The Court has established a line of jurisprudence that holds municipalities accountable for 
aspects of the realisation of the right of access to housing, despite the fact that the 
Constitution lists ‘housing’ as a concurrent power of national and provincial governments. 
The clearest expression of this was in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another.6 In this case, the City of Johannesburg argued 
it could not be held accountable for the provision of shelter to a group of residents who were 
destitute after having been evicted from private land. The City’s argument was based, in part, 
on the fact that the Constitution allocates ‘housing’ to the national and provincial 
governments concurrently and it was therefore not a local government function.7 The Court 
disagreed and held that the City was indeed accountable for providing shelter to 
communities that are rendered homeless, essentially because the responsibility to do so 
emanated from the Bill of Rights.8 The Constitutional Court’s approach in Blue Moonlight 
puts paid to the approach that a municipality is only responsible for realising a right, if it falls 
squarely within that municipality’s listed powers in the Constitution. 
  
It is submitted that this has consequences for the responsibility of local government to realise 
the right of access to food in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. Like municipalities are 
responsible for critical aspects of the right to housing, despite the fact that the Constitution 
allocates the function to national and provincial governments, so too are they responsible 
for critical of the right to food, despite the fact that the Constitution allocates the function 
                                                             
 
6 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) (Blue Moonlight). See De Visser, (2015) 'Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights against Local 
Governments in South Africa' in Bosire, C & Gikonyo, W (eds) Animating Devolution in Kenya pp 193-28 for a discussion of 
the Court’s jurisprudential trend. 
7 Blue Moonlight at para 50. 
8 Blue Moonlight at para 67. 
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to national and provincial governments. The effect of judgments such as Blue Moonlight was 
not that the Constitutional Court shifted the entire burden of realising the right of access to 
housing to municipalities. However, where the realisation of the right intersected with 
municipal responsibilities, even where they were assigned by statute, the municipality was 
responsible. In other words, municipalities are responsible for those parts of the fulfilment of 
the right to housing that intersect with what it is regularly done by municipalities. It is 
submitted that the same must then apply to the right of access to food in section 27(1)(b) of 
the Constitution: municipalities are responsible for those parts of the fulfilment of the right 
of access to food that intersect with what is regularly done by municipalities. 
 
1.2  Research question 
It is thus important to understand more about this intersection between multilevel 
government and food security, which is what this paper addresses. 
 
The manner in which the Constitution divides power between national, provincial and local 
government connects subnational governments (i.e. provinces, district municipalities, local 
municipalities and metropolitan municipalities) to food security in many ways. This paper 
therefore asks how food security intersects with the division of powers as set out in the 
Constitution. Given the abovementioned definition of food security, where are the various 
points of leverage that subnational governments, particularly municipalities have? 
 
Before answering that question, it will set out the broad constitutional architecture for the 
division of powers. This is done in general terms with some examples of powers that relate 
to food security. Subsequent to that, a more detailed discussion of specific points of 
intersection will follow in order to illustrate the argument that subnational governments, and 
local government in particular, bear important duties to contribute to the realisation of the 
right of access to food. 
 
2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE 
What follows in this section is a short overview of the manner in which the Constitution 
divides powers across the three spheres of government. It will be shown that the 
constitutional division of responsibilities, and in particular the manner in which it is practised 
and financed, makes the national government the epicentre of law and policy making 
powers. This also applies to the functions that are critical for food security. The Constitution 
bears all of the hallmarks of a federal state but there are strong unitary elements. At the same 
time, the Constitutional allocates significant powers to local government. 
 
 4 
2.1 Schedule 4A: concurrent national/provincial powers 
At the centre of the constitutional division of powers is a list of powers (in Schedule 4A of the 
Constitution) that the Constitution allocates to national and provincial governments 
concurrently. Both national and provincial governments have the authority to make law on 
this matters and implement those laws. In the event of a conflict between a national and a 
provincial law on a concurrent matter, the Constitutional Court ultimately decides which law 
prevails, using the criteria of section 146 of the Constitution. The list of concurrent powers is 
extensive and includes matters such as environment, health, housing, welfare services and 
also agriculture. 
 
Table 1: Schedule 4A – Concurrent national/provincial powers 
 Administration of indigenous forests 
 Agriculture 
 Airports other than international and 
national airports 
 Animal control and diseases 
 Casinos, racing, gambling and 
wagering, excluding lotteries and 
sports pools 
 Consumer protection 
 Cultural matters 
 Disaster management 
 Education at all levels, excluding 
tertiary education 
 Environment 
 Health services 
 Housing 
 Indigenous law and customary law, 
subject to Chapter 12 of the 
Constitution 
 Industrial promotion 
 Language policy and the regulation of 
official languages to the extent that the 
provisions of section 6 of the 
Constitution expressly confer upon the 
provincial legislatures legislative 
competence 
 Media services directly controlled or 
provided by the provincial government, 
subject to section 192 
 Nature conservation, excluding 
national parks, national botanical 
gardens and marine resources 
 Police to the extent that the provisions 
of Chapter 11 of the Constitution confer 
upon the provincial legislatures 
legislative competence 
 Pollution control 
 Population development 
 Property transfer fees 
 Provincial public enterprises in respect 
of the functional areas in this Schedule 
and Schedule 5 
 Public transport 
 Public works only in respect of the 
needs of provincial government 
departments in the discharge of their 
responsibilities to administer functions 
specifically assigned to them in terms 
of the Constitution or any other law 
 Regional planning and development 
 Road traffic regulation 
 Soil conservation 
 Tourism 
 Trade 
 Traditional leadership, subject to 
Chapter 12 of the Constitution 
 Urban and rural development 
 Vehicle licensing 
 Welfare services 
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This means, for example, that both national and provincial governments may regulate 
agriculture, one of the most critical functions related to food security. However, should a 
provincial government (1) adopt agriculture legislation that conflicts with national legislation 
and (2) this conflict is presented to the Constitutional Court, anyone of the criteria in section 
146(2) or (3) of the Constitution could result in the national law overriding the provincial law.9 
It is not within the scope of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of the content of section 
146 of the Constitution. However, it is submitted that this provision does not make it easy for 
a provincial agriculture law to prevail over a national agriculture law in the case of conflict.10 
First, the criteria in section 146(2) and (3) are many (need for norms and standards, national 
security, economic unity, protection of common market etc.). Secondly, only one needs to 
be triggered for the national law to prevail. 
 
In more than two decades since the adoption of the Constitution, not a single case 
concerning the application of section 146 of the Constitution, has been brought before the 
Constitutional Court. In other words, there has not been a single province that has asked the 
Court to declare that its provincial legislation on a Schedule 4 matter trumps national 
legislation. Similarly, there has also not been a single instance of the national government 
seeking to have provincial legislation on a Schedule 4 matter set aside. By most accounts, 
this mechanism has thus had a centralising effect on law and policy making. Both the 
wording of the Constitution and the manner in which it has been applied, has worked to make 
the national government the epicentre of law and policy making in these areas.11 
 
2.2 Schedule 5A: exclusive provincial powers 
The Constitution reserves a number of powers for provinces exclusively. These are listed in 
Schedule 5A of the Constitution. The national government may not make law on those 
matters unless there are special circumstances that warrant national government’s 
involvement. These circumstances (national security, essential national standards etc.) are 
set out in section 44((2) of the Constitution. Most of the matters in Schedule 5A of the 
Constitution are not very significant. It includes matters such as provincial sport, provincial 
cultural services and veterinary services, matters that can hardly be called considered of 
fundamental importance to the state. The functions chosen for inclusion in Schedule 5A 
makes this another centralising feature of the Constitution.12 
                                                             
 
9 See Malherbe, R (2008) ‘The Constitutional Distribution of Powers’ in De Villiers, B Review of Provinces and Local 
Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung at p 21. 
10 See De Visser, J (2017) ‘Concurrent Powers in South Africa’ in Steytler, N Concurrent Powers in Federal Systems Leiden: 
Brill Nijhoff p 227. 
11 Malherbe 2008, 47. See also De Visser 2017, 227. 
12 De Visser 2017, 227. 
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The vast majority of the powers listed there are rather insignificant13 and mean little for the 
constellation of powers surrounding food security between national and provincial 
governments. There are two possible exceptions, namely “abattoirs” and “provincial 
planning”. The latter is discussed later. 
 
Table 2: Schedule 5B - exclusive provincial powers 
 Abattoirs 
 Ambulance services 
 Archives other than national archives 
 Libraries other than national libraries 
 Liquor licences 
 Museums other than national museums 
 Provincial planning 
 Provincial cultural matters 
 Provincial recreation and amenities 
 Provincial sport 
 Provincial roads and traffic 
 Veterinary services, excluding 
regulation of the profession 
 
2.3 Exclusive (residual) national powers 
Lastly, the Constitution allocates powers exclusively to national government. Any power that 
is not mentioned in Schedule 4 or Schedule 5 is the responsibility of the national government. 
This includes a number of major powers, such as the judiciary, mining and (most parts of) 
policing. This a further ‘unitary’ feature of the Constitution and there is little doubt that it 
significantly influences the constellation of powers surrounding food security.14 For example, 
the fact that land administration (i.e. rules of land tenure) is a national competency means 
that neither provinces nor municipalities may make laws regulating the land tenure of rural 
farmers. 
 
2.4 Schedules 4B and 5B: local government 
The Constitution also contains specific municipal powers. The powers listed Schedules 4B 
and 5B of the Constitution are allocated to local government. Municipalities have the 
exclusive authority to exercise executive and legislative powers with respect to these 
matters. 
  
                                                             
 
13 Powell, D (2015) ‘Fudging Federalism’: Devolution and Peace-making in South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid to a 
Constitutional Democratic State (1990-1996)’ in Steytler, N & Ghai, Y Kenyan-South African Dialogue on Devolution Cape 
Town: Juta at p 51.  
14 De Visser 2017, 224. 
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Table 3: Schedule 4B and 5B - local government matters 
Schedule 4, Part B 
 Air pollution; 
 Building regulations; 
 Child care facilities; 
 Electricity and gas 
reticulation; 
 Firefighting services; 
 Local tourism; 
 Municipal airports; 
 Municipal planning; 
 Municipal health 
services; 
 Municipal public 
transport; 
 Municipal public works; 
 Pontoons, ferries, 
jetties, piers and 
harbours, excluding the 
regulation of 
international and 
national shipping and 
matters related thereto; 
 Stormwater 
management systems 
in built-up areas; 
 Trading regulations; 
and 
 Water and sanitation 
services limited to 
potable water supply 




Schedule 5, Part B 
 Beaches and 
amusement facilities; 








 Control of public 
nuisances; 
 Control of undertakings 
that sell liquor to the 
public; 
 Facilities for the 
accommodation, care 
and burial of animals; 
 Fencing and fences; 
 Licensing of dogs; 
 Licensing and control of 
undertakings that sell 
food to the public; 
 Local amenities; 
 Local sport facilities; 
 Markets; 
 Municipal abattoirs; 
 Municipal parks and 
recreation; 
 Municipal roads; 
 Noise pollution; 
 Pounds; 
 Public places; 
 Refuse removal, refuse 
dumps and solid waste 
disposal; 
 Street trading; 
 Street lighting; and 
 Traffic and parking.  
 
 
In principle, national and provincial governments may not exercise those powers. However, 
these local government matters are part of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. This means 
that they are national and provincial functions. They may ‘regulate’ the municipal exercise of 
those powers. In other words, they may determine an overall regulatory framework but may 
not administer or make detailed policy decisions. For example, municipalities decide on 
rezoning and subdivision (part of “municipal planning”, Schedule 4B) but the national and 
provincial governments may determine the minimum standards that municipalities must 
comply with when doing so. 
 
There are many powers in the local government list that intersect with food security as will 
be elaborated on below. 
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2.5 Intergovernmental finances and cooperative governance 
The above overview deals with the legal division of powers but it is important to complement 
it with two further dimensions that impact the reality of multilevel government, namely 
intergovernmental finance and cooperative governance. 
 
2.5.1 Intergovernmental finance 
The legal division of powers, as set out above, says little about how organs of state in the 
three spheres of government are funded. The division of responsibilities, and particularly 
how the division works out in practice, cannot be understood without reference to the 
manner in which the three spheres of government are funded.  
 
In reality, the intergovernmental financing system has a strongly centralising effect on the 
relationship between national and provincial governments. Provinces are almost exclusively 
funded by the national government in the form of an unconditional grant called the equitable 
share, augmented by a range of specific conditional grants. Provinces thus raise very little 
revenue of their own.15 The detail of this is not the focus of this paper but the upshot is that 
the intergovernmental financing system discourages legislative innovation by provinces, 
particularly when the implementation of a new provincial law would require significant 
funding. For example, no province is likely to pass legislation with ‘high cost’ 
experimentation concerning, let’s say agricultural subsidies. This is because it simply does 
not have the revenue model to go outside the strictures of existing national law. This 
phenomenon applies across the board, i.e. to all nine provinces.16  
 
With respect to local government, the effect of the intergovernmental fiscal system varies, 
depending on the type of municipality. Metropolitan and local municipalities have important 
revenue raising powers (mainly in the form of property taxation and charging fees for 
services such as electricity, water, sanitation and sewerage). Metropolitan municipalities are 
largely self-reliant, raising significant own revenue, complemented by intergovernmental 
funding in the form of the equitable share and conditional grants. Metropolitan 
municipalities thus have a revenue model that permits them to pursue their own distinct 
policy objectives. The same applies to those local municipalities that have a significant urban 
                                                             
 
15 Khumalo, B Dawood, G & Mahabir, J ‘South Africa’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations System’ in Steytler, N & Ghai, Y 
Kenyan-South African Dialogue on Devolution Cape Town: Juta at p 208. 
16 De Visser 2017, 229-233. 
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base.17 However, local municipalities with no urban base and overwhelmingly indigent 
populations are much more reliant on intergovernmental funding, sometimes for virtually 
their entire budget. District municipalities compare well to provinces when it comes their 
dependence on grant funding: they have little or no revenue-raising powers and thus depend 
almost exclusively on intergovernmental grant funding. 
 
2.5.2 Cooperative governance 
Dividing the responsibility to govern among organs of state is more complicated than what 
can be captured in lists of words. What is more, the words themselves often have no 
distinctive qualities.18 For example, the difference between “municipal planning” (Schedule 
4B) and “provincial planning” (Schedule 5A) is not clear from the wording. It is the business 
of many policy and legal experts to agonise over the meaning of the words contained in the 
Schedules and often it is excruciatingly difficult to define the precise contours of the power 
contained in a specific word. There will always be overlap and fuzzy edges in the division of 
powers. This is why the Constitution insists that organs of state in different spheres of 
government practice ‘cooperative governance’.19 An entire chapter Three in the Constitution 
is devoted to the principles of cooperative governance, which speak about the need to share 
information, consult, collaborate, avoid disputes etc. In the daily reality of governance 
intergovernmental relations is critical to ensure that the overlap and fuzzy edges in the 
division of powers do not result in service delivery failures. 
 
2.6 Further division between district and local governments 
As explained above, the Constitution allocates the powers listed in Schedule 4B and 5B to 
local government. However, this is not where the discussion pertaining to the division of local 
government powers ends. There is a further division, namely within local government 
between the tiers of local government.20  
 
Local government comprises three categories, namely metropolitan, district and local 
municipalities. Metropolitan municipalities (of which there are six) automatically assume the 
full list of constitutional powers set out in Schedules 4B and 5B so there is no further division 
necessary there. However, for district and local municipalities, it works differently. A district 
                                                             
 
17 Steytler, N & Ayele, Z (2018) ‘Local Governments in African Federal and Devolved Systems of Government: The 
Struggle for a Balance between Financial and Fiscal Autonomy and Discipline’ in Valdesalici, A & Palermo, F Comparing 
Fiscal Federalism Leiden: Brill Nijhoff at p 302-304. 
18 Steytler, N & Fessha, Y (2007) ‘Defining provincial and local government powers and functions’ South African Law 
Journal 124: 320. 
19 Ss 40-41 Constitution. 
20 Goodenough, C (2004) Shaping South Africa: Reflections on the first term of the Municipal Demarcation Board South 
Africa 1999-2004 Pretoria: Municipal Demarcation Board at p 63. 
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municipality comprises a number of local municipalities. They govern the same territory so 
the local government powers must to be divided between them. The mechanism for this is 
in Chapter Five of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act.21 This Chapter divides 
the powers listed in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution between district and local 
municipalities. It does this by providing a ‘default’ list of district powers with the remaining 
powers being allocated to local municipalities. The division is flexible though, as changes to 
this ‘default’ division can be made by provincial and national governments executively.22 
 
This division of responsibilities between district and local governments is important for food 
security. There are a number of ‘food security related’ functional areas that undergo an 
important division between district and local municipalities. 
 
Solid waste disposal is an important example. The regulation and management of refuse 
removal and solid waste disposal sites is important for food security for many reasons, of 
which two are mentioned here. First, food wastage impacts significantly on food security. 
Secondly, the waste pickers represent both a challenge and an opportunity in the context of 
food security.23 The Municipal Structures Act applies an important division to this function. 
It expects district municipalities to (1) operate solid waste disposal sites for more than one 
local municipality, (2) determine a waste disposal strategy and (3) regulate solid waste 
disposal.24 While the first element is unsurprising as a way to achieve economies of scale the 
latter two are striking.  
They suggest that local municipalities must implement district-level policy and regulation of 
waste disposal sites. The next part of the paper examines in more detail the intersection of 
the powers of local government and food security. 
 
3 EXPLORING THE INTERSECTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
POWERS AND FOOD SECURITY 
3.1 Indirect linkages 
Given the multidimensional nature of food security, there are many local government 
competencies that are indirectly linked to the realisation of the right of access to food. Two 
competencies stand out in this respect. First, it needs little argument that access to safe and 
healthy food is compromised without access to potable water. The right of access to water 
                                                             
 
21 Act 117 of 1998. 
22 Steytler, N & De Visser J (2007) Local Government Law of South Africa Durban: Lexisnexis at p 5-30 ff. 
23 Blaauw PF, Viljoen JMM, Schenck CJ et al ‘To “spot” and “point”: Managing waste pickers’ access to landfill waste in the 
North-West province’ (2015) 18. 
24 Except when the MEC for local government adjusts the division and allocates the function to a local municipality, see s 
85 Municipal Structures Act.  
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is guaranteed in the same section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution and municipalities are 
responsible for water services.25 The same argument applies to access to electricity, which is 
essential for cooking and cold storage. Municipalities are responsible for the reticulation of 
electricity.26 
 
Therefore, with regard to both electricity and water, the Constitution not only empowers, 
but also instructs municipalities to provide these services. Municipalities have the 
constitutional power to deliver water and electricity services and are compelled through the 
Bill of Rights to ensure access to basic water and electricity services to everyone. How they 
do so matters a great deal for the realisation of the right of access to food. It is particularly 
important how municipalities facilitate access to electricity and water services by extending 
infrastructure to communities that do not yet have a safe and sustainable source or 
connection. Furthermore, it is important how municipalities structure their electricity and 
water tariffs,27 particularly given the abovementioned reality that food insecurity is 
inextricably linked to poverty. 
 
3.2 The role of municipalities in local food trade 
The first important intersection between food security and local government powers can be 
observed in the area of local food trade. The Constitution lists three local government 
competencies here, namely (1) “trading regulations”,28 (2) “markets”29 and (3) “street 
trading”30. It is not easy to distinguish the three functions from one another. For example, 
what distinguishes “trading regulations” from “street trading” and what makes regulating 
“markets” different from regulating “street trading”? Over and above those differences, how 
do these functions differ from national and provincial functions, such as “trade”? It is argued 
that, despite the obvious overlap, it is possible to point out distinguishing features of these 
competences. 
                                                             
 
25 S 156(1), read with Schedule 4, Part B of the Constitution. 
26 S 156(1), read with Schedule 4, Part B of the Constitution. 
27 See s 74 Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
28 Schedule 4, Part B of the Constitution. 
29 Schedule 5, Part B of the Constitution. 
30 Schedule 5, Part B of the Constitution. 
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3.2.1 Trading regulations 
Municipalities are responsible for “trading regulations”.31 Section 84 of the Municipal 
Structures Act does not mention anything pertaining to “trading regulations”, which means 
that the function is vested in metropolitan and local municipalities.32 
 
Metropolitan and local municipalities may therefore adopt and enforce by-laws containing 
trading regulations. How is this different from the power to regulate “trade”, which the 
Constitution allocates to national and provincial governments? It is argued that “trading 
regulations” must deal with the ‘intra-municipal’ aspects of trade and may not extend to 
trade, or the impact of trade that extends beyond the municipal boundary.33 It is suggested 
that “trading regulations” is best understood as a power to regulate the impact of trade on 
the local built environment and the local community. 
 
This distinction is not always easy to make but it is perhaps best explained by using the 
example of business licencing. The national Business Act34 regulates the granting of business 
licenses by municipalities. The Act provides that a municipality must grant a business license 
if certain criteria are met. For example, the business premises must comply with a 
requirement relating to town planning, safety and health requirements. The municipality 
may furthermore refuse a license when it is satisfied that the applicant is not a suitable 
person to carry on the business.35 So does this national law not go too far in stipulating 
exactly when a municipality may and may not grant a business license? Does it not encroach 
on the municipality’s power to regulate and implement “trading regulations”? It is submitted 
that it does not. Matters such as the “suitability of the applicant” and the invitation for the 
municipality to enquire into the applicant’s character, any previous convictions and previous 
conduct are not matters that impact on the local built environment and the local community. 
They are matters that extend beyond the municipal boundary. They fall within the national 
government’s interest in regulating “trade”. To demand a certain standard with respect to 
the integrity of someone who wants to conduct the type of trade referred to in the Act falls 
within the competence of the national government with regard to “trade”. It is an issue that 
is best addressed at a national level as the national government would legitimately want to 
avoid differences in ‘integrity standards’ between provinces or between municipalities and a 
possible ‘race to the bottom’ with regard to those standards. 
                                                             
 
31 S 156(1), read with Schedule 4, Part B of the Constitution. 
32 Except when the MEC for local government adjusts the division and allocates the function to a local municipality, see s 
85 Municipal Structures Act. 
33 See further Steytler, N & De Visser J (2007) Local Government Law of South Africa Durban: Lexisnexis at p 5-20 ff. 
34 Act 71 of 1991. 
35 See, for example, De Visser, J ‘Parly has no say in sex shop site’ IOL 5 June 2014. 
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The manner in which municipalities exercise this power will impact on food security, as will 
be shown below. 
 
3.2.2 Markets 
Municipalities may regulate and operate “markets”.36 In its commonly understood meaning, 
this would refer to the regulation of open air markets, food markets, fresh produce markets 
etc. It is submitted that the term “market” in Schedule 5B relates to an area, designated or 
managed by the municipality where stalls are set out for trading, often (but not always) 
limited to certain days of the week. 
  
With respect to the role of fresh produce markets, Chonco argues convincingly that 
municipalities must realise the strategic importance of food markets in the food value 
chain.37 Fresh produce markets can be managed by, or on behalf of the municipality but they 
can also be managed by private actors under a license given by the municipality. These fresh 
produce markets should not be treated as either the informal, or the ‘deli’ exception to the 
supermarket. Instead, they must be seen as an indispensable part of the food value chain, 
capable of significantly improving access to healthy food, particularly for lower income 
communities. Municipalities must use their “markets” or “trading regulations” competencies 
to regulate trading practices in and around fresh produce markets. They may use their 
“markets” competence to ensure basic facilities and infrastructure, such as cold storage 
facilities. A final example is the use by municipalities of their “markets” competence to 
ensure law and order in and around markets.38 
 
The Municipal Structures Act further divides this function between district and local 
municipalities (see para 2.6 above). Section 84(1)(k) of the Municipal Structures Act singles 
out one component of this function, namely “the regulation of fresh produce markets (…) 
serving the area of a major proportion of the municipalities in the district” and allocates it to 
district municipalities.39 What is left of the constitutional “markets’” function remains the 
competence of local municipalities. It is suggested that, with respect to food security, this 
division has two important consequences. The first is that the law expects that those fresh 
produce markets that attract vendors and consumers from across more than one local 
municipality, are regulated and managed by metropolitan and district municipalities and not 
by local municipalities. This seems particularly significant in the context of the need to 
                                                             
 
36 S 156(1) read with Schedule 5, Part B of the Constitution. 
37 Chonco, T (2015) An analysis of municipal regulation and management of markets as an instrument to facilitate access to 
food and enhance food security LLM Thesis, University of the Western Cape at p 88. 
38 Chonco 2015, 87-92. 
39 Except when the MEC for local government adjusts the division and allocates the function to a local municipality, see s 
85 Municipal Structures Act. 
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improve the position of small scale framers and small retailers in South Africa’s food value 
chain. Any regulatory and local support effort to connect small scale farmers and small 
retailer to consumers will almost always have an impact that crosses local municipal 
jurisdictions. The consequence of the Municipal Structures Act is thus that metropolitan and 
district municipalities, and not local municipalities are expected to play a central part in the 
effort to use markets to connect small scale farmers and retailers to consumers. 
 
3.2.3 Street trading 
The last of the three municipal functions that impact on the local food trade is “street 
trading”. Distinguishing “street trading” from “trading regulations” and “markets” is not 
easy. It is submitted that a “market” refers to an area, designated or managed by the 
municipality where stalls are set out for trading, often (but not always) limited to certain days 
of the week. “Street trading” refers to the operation of a small retail business in a regular 
public space with the permission of the municipality but not in an area designated as a 
market, combining many similar businesses. 
 
3.3 Municipal planning and food security 
3.3.1 Introduction  
“Municipal planning” is one of the most critical local government powers. It is the power of 
municipalities to plan and manage the use of land, which is commonly referred to as ‘town 
planning’. It is distinct from the power to administer land, i.e. the power to regulate forms of 
land tenure and ownership.40 The administration of land is the preserve of national 
government.41 The Constitutional Court has determined on multiple occasions that ‘town 
planning’ is a municipal function and that national and provincial governments may not 
interfere with it.42 They must limit their involvement to regulating frameworks to see to the 
effective performance by municipalities of this power and may not exercise or remove a 
municipality’s power to conduct spatial planning and land use management. The Spatial 
Planning and Land Use Management Act43 (SPLUMA) codifies this division of powers 
                                                             
 
40 Berrisford S (2011) ‘Unravelling Apartheid Spatial Planning Legislation in South Africa - A Case Study’ Urban Forum 
22:247–263 at p 254. 
41 See paragraph 2.3 above. 
42 De Visser, J & Poswa, (2018) X ‘Municipal Law Making under SPLUMA: A Survey of Fifteen "First Generation" Municipal 
Planning By-Laws’ PER (forthcoming); De Visser, J (2019) ‘City Regions in Pursuit of SDG 11: Institutionalising Multilevel 
Cooperation in Gauteng, South Africa’ in Aust, H & Du Plessis, A The Globalisation of Urban Governance Routledge 186-
207. 
43 Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA). 
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between national, provincial and local government and regulates the exercise of these 
powers.  
 
“Municipal planning” has two major components. The first is the power of the municipality 
to adopt a forward looking spatial development plan, the Municipal Spatial Development 
Framework (MSDF) and possibly other smaller scale spatial development frameworks.44 The 
MSDF is a document, containing the spatial development vision for that specific municipal 
area. It is expected to inform future infrastructure investment and land use decision making. 
It also integrates spatially relevant policies and plans throughout the municipality and is 
expected to be an expression of what national and provincial governments are planning in 
the area.45 The MSDF is essentially a policy document: it does not grant land use rights. In 
other words, no individual land owner derives any rights to use his or her land in a particular 
way, from the MSDF. However, it is certainly not toothless. It has a binding effect on 
government itself: land use schemes and land use management decisions (see below) must, 
in principle, be consistent with the MSDF.46 The municipal power and process with respect 
to the MSDF is critically important for a municipality’s role in realising food security. An 
MSDF can be the pivot that connects initiatives and public investment of various government 
institutions across the three spheres of government to promote food security in the local 
space. 
 
The second component of the “municipal planning” power is the power to determine 
permitted land uses in the municipality. The municipality determines what land use is 
permitted in the municipality. It does so by adopting a land use (or zoning) scheme47 and by 
deciding on applications from land owners and developers to change the zoning and 
therefore amend the permitted land use. Furthermore, it decides on applications to 
subdivide land parcels, alter land us restrictions that appear in title deeds and consent uses. 
By doing all of the above, municipalities determine land use rights.48 As stated above, these 
decisions must, in principle, be in line with what is set out in the MSDF. 
 
Municipal decision making with respect to the determination and enforcement of land use 
rights plays an important role in improving food security. Two specific intersections will be 
discussed next. They concern, firstly, the connection between municipal planning decisions 
                                                             
 
44 S 5(1)(a) and (b) SPLUMA. 
45 Ss 20-21 SPLUMA. 
46 Ss 22 and 24(2)(g) SPLUMA. 
47 S 24 SPLUMA. 
48 See, for example, section 41(2) SPLUMA. 
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and the productive use of agricultural land and thus food production. Secondly, the concern 
the connection between municipal planning decision and facilitating access to food. 
 
3.3.2 Connecting municipal planning and agricultural land 
Municipalities are established throughout South Africa. In other words, there is ‘wall-to-wall’ 
local government.49 This means that all agricultural land is included in a municipality. By 
using its power to rezone or subdivide, a municipality may change agricultural land into land 
used for residential, commercial or other non-agricultural purposes. This affects agricultural 
production and, so it is argued, ultimately affects the country’s ability to ensure food 
security.50 The Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act51 (SALA) exists to deal with the threat of 
the loss of agricultural land due to the conversion of agricultural land into land used for other 
purposes. It is a critical part of government’s legislative architecture to protect agricultural 
production. It does this by subjecting the subdivision of agricultural land to the approval of 
the national Minister responsible for Agriculture. In other words, it permits the national 
Minister to veto municipal planning decisions affecting agricultural land. 
 
The history of SALA is important in order to understand its current application. The Act was 
adopted long before the introduction of the current local government regime. At the time, 
agricultural areas were largely excluded from the boundaries of the old local governments 
and SALA was applied there to control the conversion of agricultural land. After all 
agricultural areas were absorbed into the new ‘wall-to-wall’ local government system in the 
late nineties, Parliament repealed SALA.52 One of the main arguments for the repeal was 
that it was too blunt a mechanism and that it purported to use land use regulation to deal 
with a problem that ought to be handled differently (see below). In 1998, Parliament thus 
passed the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Repeal Act.53 However, President Nelson 
Mandela did not sign the Act into power, ostensibly under pressure of the commercial 
agricultural sector. It therefore continued to apply. In Wary Holdings,54 its constitutionality 
was challenged. One of the arguments was that it interfered with the constitutional authority 
of municipalities to conduct ‘municipal planning’. SALA survived the constitutional challenge 
                                                             
 
49 S 151(1) Constitution. 
50 Steytler, N (2009) ‘The Decisions in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd V Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (1) Sa 337 (Cc): Be 
Wary of these Holdings’ in Constitutional Court Review 2009(2) at p 429. 
51 Act 70 of 1970. 
52 See Steytler, N (2009) ‘The Decisions in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd V Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Another 2009 (1) Sa 337 (Cc): Be 
Wary of these Holdings’ in Constitutional Court Review 2009(2) at pp 429-431. 
53 Subdivision of Agricultural Land Repeal Act, 1998. 
54 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC). 
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on the basis of complicated, technical arguments pertaining to precise trajectory of the 
transitional legislation. The argument that it interfered with ‘municipal planning’ was not 
fully addressed.55 
 
As a result, SALA continues to apply and subject municipal planning decisions on agricultural 
land to a national veto. There are serious policy considerations in favour of, and against 
retaining SALA (or a similar mechanism).  
 
The most important argument in favour of retaining SALA or a SALA-type mechanism is that 
the incentive structure for municipalities fundamentally works against preserving 
agricultural land. The levying of property rates and the sale of municipal services (such as 
water, electricity, sanitation and refuse removal) are critical sources of revenue for 
municipalities. The municipal revenue potential of agricultural land is very little compared to 
the municipal revenue potential of land used intensively for residential, commercial or 
industrial purposes. There is thus a clear incentive for municipalities to facilitate the 
development of agricultural areas into residential, commercial or industrial areas and little, 
or no incentive for them to retain agricultural land, so the argument goes. As Steytler argues: 
“Preserving agricultural land for the greater good of the country’s food security, is unlikely to 
feature strongly in the calculations of a council trying to be self-sufficient by increasing its 
rates revenue base”.56 
 
Secondly, it can be argued that the assessment of the agricultural potential of a piece of land 
requires specialised expertise. This expertise is not present in municipalities who are not 
geared towards regulating agriculture (which is not their function). It is present in provincial 
and national departments of agriculture.57 
 
There are policy arguments against retaining SALA or a SALA-type mechanism too. The 
purpose of SALA is to ‘control the subdivision of agricultural land and, in connection 
therewith, the use of agricultural land’.58 The most fundamental policy argument against the 
Act is that its implementation, if not the text itself, is firmly based on the assumption that 
                                                             
 
55 Except in the dissenting opinion of Justice Yacoob, who held that SALA impermissibly interfered with ‘municipal 
planning’. See Steytler 2009, 439 ff. 
56 Steytler 2009, 444 
57 Steytler 2009, 444. 
58 See the Long Title of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. 
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farm size determines productivity.59 However, there is by no means consensus among 
agricultural experts that farm size is a useful proxy for agricultural productivity. In fact, most 
agricultural experts agree that what constitutes a viable farm unit varies widely across the 
country, depending on soil conditions, rainfall and, most importantly, the type of agricultural 
model pursued on that farm.60 In fact, and this is the second argument against the current 
model, SALA was introduced and still functions to protect a powerful commercial agricultural 
industry, comprising of large scale commercial farmers, the vast majority of whom are white. 
By discouraging the subdivision of agricultural land, the Act has been singled out as a key 
obstacle to the transformation of the agricultural sector and the entrance of new, black 
agricultural entrepreneurs. Closely linked to this is the third argument, namely that the 
ethos, underpinning the Act held back the pace of land restitution and land redistribution. 
The provisions of the Act itself are not to blame because SALA includes a provision 
empowering the Minister to exempt land restitution or land redistribution projects from its 
application. However, this exception was not applied once in two decades of attempts at land 
reform, thus indicating that the flexibility offered by the Act could not trump the strong ethos 
underpinning it. 
 
Aside from the above compelling policy considerations against retaining a SALA or SALA-
type mechanism, there are legal arguments that cast serious doubt over the constitutionality 
of SALA. This is despite the fact that it survived a constitutional challenge in 2008 in Wary 
Holdings. 
 
As indicated earlier, municipalities in South Africa enjoy strong constitutional protection of 
their municipal planning powers. These powers have been confirmed and clarified in a series 
of seven Constitutional Court judgments namely Gauteng Development Tribunal, Lagoonbay, 
Habitat Council, Tronox, Pieterse, Maccsands and Chairman of the National Building 
Regulations Review Board.61 These judgments were delivered subsequent to the Wary 
Holdings judgment that saved SALA.  
                                                             
 
59 See Johnstone 2019. See also Moor G ‘Subdivision and land use laws hinder land reform and are 
unconstitutional’ (2018) available at https://www.golegal.co.za/subdivision-land-reform-unconstitutional/ 9 
accessed 15 January 2019) and Wandile S ‘Perspectives on Farm Sizes’ (2018) available at 
https://wandilesihlobo.com/2018/11/18/perspectives-on-farm-sizes/ (accessed 15 January 2019). 
60 Johnstone 2019. 
61 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and others [2008] 2 All SA 298 (W); 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v The Minister for Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning 
of the Western Cape & Others [2013] ZASCA 13 (15 March 2013); Habitat Council and Another v Provincial Minister of Local 
Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape and Others [2013] ZAWCHC 112 (14 August 
2013); Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal and Others 2016 (3) SA 160 
(CC); Pieterse NO v Lephalale Local Municipality 2017 (2) BCLR 233 (CC); Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 
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The narrative surrounding the protection of local government’s municipal planning powers 
commenced in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development 
Tribunal. In this case the City of Johannesburg asked the Constitutional Court to declare parts 
of the Development Facilitation Act (DFA) unconstitutional. The DFA empowered provincial 
planning tribunals to take land-use decisions, something that the Constitution reserves for 
municipalities, so the City argued. The Constitutional Court agreed with the City and 
declared the DFA unconstitutional. The judgment underscored the central role that 
municipalities play in land-use management and significantly reduced the scope for 
provincial interference with municipal powers. It essentially located municipalities at the 
centre of the land-use management framework. In subsequent years more litigation 
surrounding municipal planning powers reached the Constitutional Court. In fact, this 
innocuous and technical part of the Constitution became the subject of six further 
Constitutional Court judgments, following each other in rapid succession. Without fail, each 
judgment confirmed the approach taken in Gauteng Development Tribunal, namely that 
national and provincial governments may not usurp the powers of municipalities with respect 
to “municipal planning”. The national government does not trump municipal land-use 
decisions by issuing mining licences (Maccsands). Provincial governments may not subject 
municipal land-use decisions to a veto, even if the development impacts on an entire region 
(Lagoonbay). Provincial governments may also not subject municipal land-use decisions or 
building approvals to provincial or national appeals (Habitat Council, Pieterse, Tronox and 
Chairman of the National Building Regulations Appeal Board). The seven judgments are 
summarised below, for ease of reference. 
 
  
                                                             
 
2012 (4) SA 181 (CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the National Building Regulations 
Review Board and Others 2018 (8) BCLR 881 (CC); 2018 (5) SA 1 (CC). 
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It is submitted that the jurisprudential trend surrounding municipal planning powers could 
not be clearer. Any national or provincial legislation that removes executive authority from 
municipalities with respect to their municipal planning powers is unconstitutional. In the 
same vein, no law may empower a national or provincial body to ‘second-guess’ municipal 
decision-making with respect to any of its constitutional powers, in the form of vetoes, 
appeals, or other attempts to override a municipality’s powers. In light of that firm 
jurisprudential trend, it is submitted that SALA would not survive a constitutional challenge 
to its ministerial veto powers over municipal land use management decisions. 
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The policy and constitutional flaws of SALA should not be read to imply that the 
development of agricultural land must simply be encouraged and that municipal power to 
change the permitted use of agricultural land must be unfettered. The challenges 
surrounding the orientation of municipalities towards development and the capacity lacuna 
in local government on agriculture are very real and serious. However, the current regime is 
not suitable and must be replaced by a more refined regime. 
 
SPLUMA, the new legislative regime for municipal planning, is an important start to that new 
regime for protecting agricultural land. It contains the limits within which municipalities 
conduct their spatial planning and land use management. There are at least eight specific 
provisions in SPLUMA that, in one way or another, instruct municipalities to consider the 
agricultural potential of land that it is considering to rezoning or subdivide. 
 
1. The Preamble to the Act specifically mentions the right to food in section 27 of the 
Constitution, signifying that the realisation of the right to food is one of the drivers for 
the adoption and implementation of SPLUMA. 
2. Section 3(d) of SPLUMA includes “the sustainable and efficient use of land” as one of its 
objects. 
3. Section 7(b)(ii) of SPLUMA lists the need to “ensure that special consideration is given to 
the protection of prime and agricultural land” as one of the principles that municipalities 
must consider when taking spatial planning or land use management decisions.  
4. Section 8(2) of the Act empowers the national Minister to proclaim norms and standards 
on matters such as “desirable settlement patterns”, “rural revitalisation” and “sustainable 
development”. 
5. Section 12(1)(n) of the Act stipulates that spatial development framework must “give 
effect to national legislation and policies on (...) the sustainable utilisation and protection 
of agricultural land”. 
6. Section 21(j) of the Act specifies this for municipalities and insists that the MSDF must 
include "a strategic assessment of the environmental pressures and opportunities within 
the municipal area, including ... high potential agricultural land". 
7. Section 25(1) of the Act demands that municipal land use schemes must have "minimal 
impact on ... natural resources". 
8. Section 52 (1) of the Act empowers the national Minister to decide land development 
applications “where such an application materially impacts on (...) food security (…) or 
land use for agriculture”. While this provision may sound similar to what is provided in 
SALA, it differs in two important respects. Firstly, while SALA provides for a veto on a 
municipal decision, SPLUMA provides for a procedure alongside the municipal procedure 
and resulting in a separate decision. Secondly, while SALA locates the veto power in the 
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Minister responsible for agriculture, SPLUMA locates this national power in the Minister 
of Rural Development and Land Reform. 
 
Proponents of SALA may argue that the above provisions do not provide nearly the same 
protection as the Ministerial veto. However, it is hard to rebut the argument that they 
provide legal protection of agricultural resources against harmful development in a manner 
that is far less restrictive to local government’s constitutional powers over municipal 
planning than the Ministerial veto. The powers under section 52 in particular, empower the 
national government to stop development that is set to harm food security. It is suggested 
that this has ultimately the same effect as the SALA veto. 
 
In summary, both the policy and constitutional flaws surrounding SALA should prompt 
government to revisit the manner in which it seeks to exert national control over municipal 
planning decision pertaining to agricultural land. 
 
3.3.3 Connecting municipal planning and access to food  
In the preceding sections, it was argued that a municipality has original powers to conduct 
spatial planning and land use management within its jurisdiction. It must exercise these 
powers within the framework determined by SPLUMA (and, where applicable further 
provincial legislation). It was argued that his power is significant and enhances a 
municipality’s ability to influence the availability of food through the protection of 
agricultural land. This next section argues that, in addition to impacting the availability or 
production of healthy food, the municipal planning power also impacts the municipality’s 
ability to facilitate access, particularly for disadvantaged communities. 
 
Take, for example, a municipality’s power over zoning, i.e. the adoption of a land use (or 
zoning) scheme and the alteration of existing zonings.62 Much of South Africa’s formal 
planning landscape for suburbs is characterised by ‘single use zones’, i.e. the separation of 
residential, commercial, industrial and other uses. Commercial activity is generally 
discouraged in residential areas. While this approach serves a peaceful suburban lifestyle, 
separate from the hustle and bustle of commercial areas, it makes little sense in South 
Africa’s low income and informal areas where residential and informal business activity flows 
into one another. Residential dwellings are used for commercial use and it is not uncommon 
for informal retailers to sleep in the places from which they trade. In that context, the dogged 
insistence on single use zones as the norm, constricts and imposes a heavy regulatory burden 
                                                             
 
62 Ss 24, 28 and 41 SPLUMA. 
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on informal entrepreneurial activity. Deviation from the single use zoning norm, necessitates 
applications for departures, consent uses, rezoning and building permits and thus entails 
(oftentimes expensive) bureaucracy. Ultimately, it pushes small, informal businesses into 
illegality.63 SPLUMA expects municipalities to extend land use schemes (or zoning schemes) 
into informal areas.64 However, it also instructs them to do so sensibly and incrementally, i.e. 
with due consideration of effects such as the above.65 For example, section 24(2)(c) of 
SPLUMA instructs municipalities to “include provisions that permit the incremental 
introduction of land use management and regulation in areas under traditional leadership, 
rural areas, informal settlements, slums and areas not previously subject to a land use 
scheme”. 
 
Furthermore, SPLUMA envisages the adoption of municipal planning by-laws that deal with 
the enforcement of land use schemes.66 
 
The Constitutional Court has accepted that asymmetrical enforcement of municipal rules, 
such as municipal tariffs, is permissible if there is an underlying, rational policy that is 
formally expressed.67 It can be argued that the extension of zoning rules into low income and 
informal areas can be accompanied by low intensity enforcement of those zoning rules in 
order not to chase micro-enterprises into illegality.68 Small, informal food outlets play a 
critical role in local food systems.69 It follows, therefore that a municipality’s efforts to use its 
zoning powers to regularise (or not) micro-enterprises matters a great deal for local food 
systems. 
 
Furthermore, the municipality can influence the regulatory and bureaucratic burden that is 
imposed on informal food traders in low income and informal settlements. SPLUMA 
recognises the bureaucratic burden that the planning system imposes. It instructs 
municipalities to identify areas in its MSDF “where incremental approaches to development 
and regulation will be applicable” and where “shortened land use development procedures 
                                                             
 
63 See Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation Post-apartheid spatial inequality: obstacles of land use management on township 
micro-enterprise formalisation (2017). 
64 Ss 7(a)(iv) SPLUMA and 24(1) SPLUMA. 
65 S 24(2)(a) instructs municipalities “include appropriate categories of land use zoning and regulations for the entire 
municipal area, including areas not previously subject to a land use scheme”. 
66 See De Visser, J & Poswa, X Implementing SPLUMA: A Review of Municipal Planning By-Laws (2017) Cape Town: Dullah 
Omar Institute (www.dullahomarinstitute.org.za, accessed 26 November 2018). 
67 See City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC). 
68 See, for example, De Visser & Poswa (2017) at p 24 for an example of low intensity enforcement rules in traditional 
areas of KwaZulu-Natal. 
69 See, for example, Johnstone S (2018) Municipal Planning to Facilitate Access to Food p 50 (PhD Thesis, forthcoming). 
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may be applicable and land use schemes may be so amended”.70 It is argued that 
municipalities should consider finding ways to ease the regulatory burden on informal food 
traders in low income and informal settlements. This may relate also relate to the setting of 
tariffs for land use applications: the municipality now controls the tariff structure and could 
consider adopting a progressive tariff structure that encourages informal traders to 
regularise their building and planning approval. In short, a progressive approach by the 
municipality to the regulatory burden surrounding planning and building regulations could 
enable more informal traders to formalise the planning approvals pertaining to their 
businesses. This adds stability to their operations and increases their chances of accessing 
capital and overall benefits the accessibility of healthy food particularly in disadvantaged 
areas. 
 
A third example of a point of leverage for a municipality that may be used to facilitate greater 
access to healthy food relates to the use of conditions to land use approvals. A municipality 
that is considering a land use application, such as an application for rezoning, subdivision, 
consent use etc., has leverage over the applicant. Section 43(1) of SPLUMA provides that an 
application may be approved subject to such conditions as the municipality prescribes. This 
leverage can, and should, be used by the municipality to negotiate outcomes that go beyond 
the narrow interests of the applicant in a land use right. This already happens. It is common 
for municipalities to impose condition that assist it to recoup the additional bulk expenditure 
(e.g. a new sewerage plant) required to make the development possible. More progressively, 
cities are starting to approve inner city commercial housing projects together with conditions 
that force developers to include low cost housing units into the development.71 It is argued 
that municipalities should explore using this leverage to impose conditions that force 
developers into behaviour that improves the food system, such as facilitating market access 
for small and informal traders. For example, why not add a condition to the approval of a 
retail mall development that a certain percentage of the floor space is designated for small, 
emerging food retailers? 
 
3.4 Other municipal competencies and access to food 
There are other municipal powers that can be innovatively used to promote access to food. 
For example, municipalities have the authority to regulate “Billboards and the display of 
                                                             
 
70 S 21(k) and (l)(ii) SPLUMA. 
71 See Ndifuna Ukwazi “Cape Town Planning Tribunal Imposes First-Ever Affordable Housing Condition on Zero2one 
Skyscraper” (https://www.facebook.com/NdifunaUkwazi/posts/cape-town-planning-tribunal-imposes-first-ever-
affordable-housing-condition-on-z/1784109608274285/, accessed 26 November 2018). 
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advertisements in public places”.72 Can this power be used to discourage the advertising of 
unhealthy food, particularly around schools? Can it be used to encourage the advertising of 
healthy foods? A second example is that municipalities manage “refuse removal, refuse 
dumps and solid waste disposal”.73 Can this power be used to creatively include waste pickers 
in the food and waste recycling chain with the aim of reducing waste, and improving the 
waste pickers’ well-being, income and thus access to food?74 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that the realisation of the right of access to food is by no means a duty 
that is borne exclusively by national and provincial governments. It was argued that the 
Constitution allocates many functions to local government that offer points of leverage for 
municipalities to make meaningful contributions to the realisation of the right of access to 
food. 
 
With respect to enhancing the availability of food, there is a critical set of planning 
responsibilities that ultimately impact food production. It was argued that the legal 
framework, aimed at controlling the development of agricultural land is no longer 
appropriate and unconstitutional. The need to discourage the sacrificing of agricultural 
potential at the altar of development requires a new approach. This new approach must 
move away from the focus on farm size as a proxy for productivity and must recognise the 
enhanced status of local government in the regulation and control of land use. 
 
With respect to enhancing access to healthy and nutritious food, the municipal planning 
responsibilities are equally important. They offer points of leverage for municipalities to find 
a better balance between the role of large retailers and local food traders in the market. They 
may also offer opportunities to reduce the regulatory burden on food traders in low income 
and informal settlements. There are a number of other municipal competencies that offer 
opportunities for municipalities to help improve access to healthy and nutritious food. 
Municipalities can use their power to regulate fresh produce markets to connect small scale 
farmers and informal traders to consumers. They can use their power to regulate refuse 
removal to reduce food wastage. They can use their power to regulate Billboard to 
discourage the promotion of unhealthy foods. 
 
                                                             
 
72 Schedule 5, Part B Constitution. See also Johnstone (2018) at p 52. 
73 Schedule 5, Part B Constitution. 
74 See Damon L (2018) Municipal regulation of food and waste pickers on landfill sites in South Africa: what should 
municipalities (dis)allow? UWC LLM Thesis (forthcoming); Sodlala N (2018) What is the role of local government to manage 
food waste across the food supply chain? UWC LLM Thesis (forthcoming).  
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The argument of this paper is not to claim that all of the above suggestions are all equally 
credible policy proposals. In fact, policy experts may disagree with some of them or have 
much more refined proposal. The argument of this paper is rather that there are many points 
where local government powers intersect with what is required to realise the right of access 
to food. If municipalities use this leverage constructively and progressively, perhaps along 
the lines of some of the proposals made in this paper, more progress can be made in the 







Steytler, N & De Visser J (2007) Local Government Law of South Africa Durban: Lexisnexis 
 
Chapters in books 
De Visser, J (2015) 'Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights against Local Governments in 
South Africa' in Bosire, C & Gikonyo, W Animating Devolution in Kenya Rome: IDLO pp 
193-28  
De Visser, J (2017) ‘Concurrent Powers in South Africa’ in Steytler, N Concurrent Powers in 
Federal Systems Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 
De Visser, J (2019) ‘City Regions in Pursuit of SDG 11: Institutionalising Multilevel 
Cooperation in Gauteng, South Africa’ in Aust, H & Du Plessis, A The Globalisation of Urban 
Governance Routledge 186-207 
Khumalo, B Dawood, G & Mahabir, J ‘South Africa’s Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
System’ in Steytler, N & Ghai, Y Kenyan-South African Dialogue on Devolution Cape Town: 
Juta 
Malherbe, R (2008) ‘The Constitutional Distribution of Powers’ in De Villiers, B Review of 
Provinces and Local Governments in South Africa: Constitutional Foundations and Practice 
Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
Powell, D (2015) ‘Fudging Federalism’: Devolution and Peace-making in South Africa’s 
Transition from Apartheid to a Constitutional Democratic State (1990-1996)’ in Steytler, 
N & Ghai, Y Kenyan-South African Dialogue on Devolution Cape Town: Juta  
Steytler, N & Ayele, Z (2018) ‘Local Governments in African Federal and Devolved Systems 
of Government: The Struggle for a Balance between Financial and Fiscal Autonomy and 
Discipline’ in Valdesalici, A & Palermo, F Comparing Fiscal Federalism Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 
 
Journal articles 
Berrisford S (2011) ‘Unravelling Apartheid Spatial Planning Legislation in South Africa - A 
Case Study’ Urban Forum 22: 247–263. 
Blaauw PF, Viljoen JMM, Schenck CJ et al ‘To “spot” and “point”: Managing waste pickers’ 
access to landfill waste in the North-West province’ (2015) 18. 
De Visser, J & Poswa, X (2018) ‘Municipal Law Making under SPLUMA: A Survey of Fifteen 
"First Generation" Municipal Planning By-Laws’ PER (forthcoming) 
Steytler, N & Fessha, Y (2007) ‘Defining provincial and local government powers and 
functions’ South African Law Journal 124 
 28 
Steytler, N (2009) ‘The Decisions in Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd V Stalwo (Pty) Ltd and Another 
2009 (1) Sa 337 (Cc): Be Wary of these Holdings’ in Constitutional Court Review 2009(2) 
 
Research papers 
Goodenough, C (2004) Shaping South Africa: Reflections on the first term of the Municipal 
Demarcation Board South Africa 1999-2004 Pretoria: Municipal Demarcation Board 
Oxfam GB Hidden Hunger in Southern Africa: The Faces of Hunger and Malnutrition in a Food-
Secure Nation (2014) 
Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation Post-apartheid spatial inequality: obstacles of land use 
management on township micro-enterprise formalisation (2017) 
 
Government policies and reports 
Statistics South Africa Statistical release: community survey 2016 available at 
www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=737&id=1 (accessed 24 June 2018). 
 
Caselaw 
City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and 
Another 2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC) (Blue Moonlight) 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the National Building 
Regulations Review Board and Others 2018 (8) BCLR 881 (CC); 2018 (5) SA 1 (CC) 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and others 
[2008] 2 All SA 298 (W) 
Habitat Council and Another v Provincial Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs 
and Development Planning, Western Cape and Others [2013] ZAWCHC 112 (14 August 
2013) 
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) Ltd v The Minister for Local Government, Environmental 
Affairs and Development Planning of the Western Cape & Others [2013] ZASCA 13 (15 March 
2013) 
Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2012 (4) SA 181 (CC) 
Pieterse NO v Lephalale Local Municipality 2017 (2) BCLR 233 (CC) 
Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal and 
Others 2016 (3) SA 160 (CC) 
Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2008 (11) BCLR 1123 (CC) 
 
 29 
Newspaper reports and opinion pieces 
De Visser, J ‘Parly has no say in sex shop site’ IOL 5 June 2014 
Ndifuna Ukwazi ‘Cape Town Planning Tribunal Imposes First-Ever Affordable Housing 
Condition on Zero2one Skyscraper’ 
(https://www.facebook.com/NdifunaUkwazi/posts/cape-town-planning-tribunal-
imposes-first-ever-affordable-housing-condition-on-z/1784109608274285/, accessed 26 
November 2018) 
Moor G ‘Subdivision and land use laws hinder land reform and are unconstitutional’ (2018) 
available at https://www.golegal.co.za/subdivision-land-reform-unconstitutional/ 
(accessed 15 January 2019)  
Sihlobo, W ‘Perspectives on Farm Sizes’ (2018) available at 




Chonco, T (2015) An analysis of municipal regulation and management of markets as an 
instrument to facilitate access to food and enhance food security LLM Thesis, University of 
the Western Cape 
Damon L (2018) Municipal regulation of food and waste pickers on landfill sites in South Africa: 
what should municipalities (dis)allow? UWC LLM Thesis (forthcoming) 
Johnstone S (2018) Municipal Planning to Facilitate Access to Food (LLD Thesis, forthcoming) 
Sodlala N (2018) What is the role of local government to manage food waste across the food 
supply chain? UWC LLM Thesis (forthcoming) 
 
Legislation 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Repeal Act, 1998 
